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Courage, Cowardice and Combat Performance: 
Eighth Army and the Crisis in North Africa, 1942. 
 
I have to say something which is not easy to say from the touch line. In the armies 
of the democracies . . .  there are sometimes soft spots and we have been told there 
is evidence that in the case of some of the troops at . . . Tobruk the enemy found 
some of these spots. (Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage)1 
 
By 1942, the situation facing Eighth Army in the desert in North Africa had 
become so serious that the Commander-in-Chief Middle Eastern Forces (MEF), Sir 
Claude Auchinleck, with the unanimous agreement of his army commanders, 
forwarded to the War Office a recommendation for the reintroduction of the death 
penalty (which had been abolished in 1930) for ‘desertion in the field’ and for 
‘misbehaving in the face of the enemy in such a manner as to show cowardice.’ This 
request raised serious questions about the conduct and courage of the men who were 
serving in Eighth Army. Auchinleck contended that the death penalty would act as a 
‘salutary deterrent’ to cowards and those men who would desert in action or surrender 
unnecessarily.2  
 
Auchinleck first raised the issue in April 1942 after the disappointment of the German 
counter offensive in early February. To back up his request, he presented evidence 
that since April 1941 there had been 291 convictions for desertion and 19 convictions 
for cowardice in the Middle Eastern theatre.3 Auchinleck, at the time, felt the situation 
was so serious that, while waiting for a response, he took matters into his own hands 
and ordered that senior officers were to ‘take the strongest possible action against any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (London, 1945), p. 17. 
2 National Archives (NA) WO 32/15773 Auchinleck to the Under Secretary of State, the War Office, 7 
April 1942. 
3 Ibid. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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individual of whatever rank who refuse[d] to conform to orders. If necessary in order 
to stop panic, there must be no hesitation in resorting to extreme measures, such as 
shooting an individual who cannot otherwise be stopped.’4 
 
Following the fall of Tobruk and the retreat from the Gazala line, Auchinleck once 
again cabled London demanding the return of the death penalty. He provided yet 
more statistics to lend weight to his argument, reporting that 63 absentees had been 
apprehended at Matruh in a single day during the ‘Knightsbridge’ fighting along the 
Gazala line in June 1942. During the 27 days of battle ending 13 July 1942, 907 
absentees had been reported to the Corps of Military Police of whom 430 were 
subsequently apprehended. The total number of unapprehended British and Colonial 
absentees was still 1,728 at the time of writing. The average monthly number of 
soldiers sentenced for desertion in the five months from February to June 1942 was 
34. There were over 120 soldiers awaiting trial by courts martial in Cairo and in one 
high category unit (it is apparent that this was the Guards Brigade), 18 cases of 
desertion in the face of the enemy had been reported during the recent fighting.5 He 
later amended this figure to 23 desertions during and immediately after the 
‘Knightsbridge’ fighting. ‘In view of the high quality personnel of this unit’, 
Auchinleck found this figure ‘most striking.’6  
 
Historians have queried the accuracy of the picture portrayed by Auchinleck.7 David 
French, in particular, has argued that the statistics used reveal little about the state of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 NA WO 201/538 Corbett to 8, 9 and 10 Armies, 24 May 1942. 
5 NA WO 32/15773 C-in-C Middle East to the War Office, 24 July 1942. 
6 NA WO 32/15773 C-in-C Middle East to the War Office, 9 August 1942. 
7 Desmond Young, Rommel (London, 1950), p. 162; Jon Latimer, Alamein (London, 2002), pp. 97-8; 
Martin Kitchen, Rommel’s Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941-1943 (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 287. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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Eighth Army in the summer of 1942.8 The case can certainly be made that Auchinleck 
drew attention to the problem of absenteeism in Eighth Army as a way of shifting 
blame for his own shortcomings onto the frontline troops. Auchinleck, and his Army 
Commander Lieutenant-General Sir Neil Ritchie, made significant errors during the 
operations around the Gazala line. Both commanders’ preference for ‘Jock columns’ 
and ‘brigade groups’ prevented Eighth Army from massing sufficient firepower at the 
decisive point. Auchinleck’s failure either to take complete control of Eighth Army or 
to let Ritchie do his job unfettered as Army Commander meant that there was a lack 
of clear direction and vital decisions were often delayed because ‘two hands were on 
the helm.’9 These deficiencies undoubtedly had a negative effect on the manner in 
which the battle was directed, but, and perhaps more importantly, they also had a 
direct effect on the conduct of the troops.  
 
I have argued elsewhere, that the rates of desertion and surrender during the summer 
of 1942, especially when taken together, were a major factor in Eighth Army’s poor 
combat performance.10 The question, however, of whether and to what extent 
desertion and surrender were symptomatic of a lack of courage or even the result of 
cowardice has not been directly addressed.  
 
The conceptualisation of courage and cowardice can be divided into two broad 
strands. One strand emphasises the willingness of the courageous person to engage in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 David French, ‘Discipline and the Death Penalty in the British Army in the War against Germany 
during the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 33, no. 4, October, 1998, p. 
541. 
9 NA WO 236/1 Lieut. Gen. Sir George Erskine, HQ British Troops in Egypt, Middle East Land 
Forces, 5 September 1950 to J.A.J. Agar-Hamilton, Union War History Section of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, 724, Government Avenue, Pretoria. 
10 Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the 
Path to El Alamein (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 34-46. 
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certain acts and, conversely, the reluctance of the coward to engage in such acts. In 
the fourth century BC, Plato insisted that ‘whoever is willing to fight the enemy 
staying in his rank and does not flee, he, certainly, is courageous.’11 In the Iliad, 
Homer described cowards as those that were ‘unwilling’ to fight.12 He had Odysseus 
say that ‘it is the cowards who walk out of the fighting, but if one is to be preeminent 
in battle, he must by all means stand his ground strongly, whether he be struck or 
strike down another.’13 The act of leaving one’s place in battle and throwing away 
one’s shield was, in Athens and Sparta, the epitome of cowardice; hence ‘the famous 
instruction of the Spartan mother to her warrior son, to return “with your shield or on 
it”.’14 More recently, the British Army Act laid down ‘that a man is guilty of 
cowardice when he displays “an unsoldierlike regard for his personal safety in the 
presence of the enemy” by shamefully deserting his post or laying down his arms.’15  
 
Another strand of usages is less concerned with the courageous or cowardly actions in 
themselves and puts more emphasis on how these actions express an individual’s 
ability to cope with fear. Where a person acts in spite of fear his behaviour can be 
labelled courageous. Where an individual fails to act due to fear his behaviour can be 
labelled cowardly. Thus, the courageous person copes with fear, the coward does not. 
Aristotle said that ‘it is characteristic of the courageous person to endure what is – and 
appears – fearful for a human being, because it is noble to do so and shameful not 
to.’16 According to The Oxford English Dictionary courage is ‘the ability to do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 J.E. Lendon, Soldiers & Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (Yale, 2005), p. 51. 
12 Ibid., p. 29. 
13 Ibid., p. 35. 
14 Ibid., pp. 52-3. 
15 Quoted in Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p. 20. 
16 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2000), Book 3 Chapter viii. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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something that frightens one.’ Cowardice, is ‘a lack of bravery’ or courage.17 Anthony 
Kellett, in Combat Motivation, said that courage could be defined as the ‘triumph of 
willpower over fear’.18 Richard Holmes, in Acts of War, has similarly defined courage 
as the soldier’s ability to master fear.19 Cowardice, conversely, is the inability to act 
because of fear.  
 
Drawing on research on the North African campaign and the broad historiography on 
combat performance, this article explores the relationship between courage, 
cowardice and combat performance. It analyses the various factors that influence 
courageous and cowardly acts on the battlefield and investigates to what extent these 
played a role in determining Eighth Army’s combat performance in the summer of 
1942. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
The question of whether Auchinleck’s characterisation of the problem facing Eighth 
Army was accurate must first be addressed.20 The 1,728 absentees reported by 
Auchinleck in July 1942 represented around 0.9 per cent of the c.191,000 men who 
were engaged in operations in the desert in the summer of 1942. This was equivalent 
to about 3.6 per cent of those who were likely to have been fighting on the front line, 
between 27 May and 24 July 1942.21 Taken at face value, these raw figures do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford, 1998). 
18 Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston, 1982), p. 300. 
19 Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London, 2004), p. 213. First 
published in 1985 under the title Firing Line. 
20 It should be noted that the death penalty was not reintroduced. This was due to political expediency 
rather than operational realities. See NA WO 32/15773 Death Penalty for Desertion in the Field: 
Reintroduction, 1942. 
21 NA WO 163/51 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active 
Service, 11 August 1942; Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, p. 248-57. An 
infantry division at this time, when at full establishment, comprised of around 757 officers and 16,764 
enlisted men. Only a small proportion of these men, however, were usually involved in heavy fighting, 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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appear unduly high. However, cognizance must be taken of two points if the full 
significance of the reported crisis is to be understood. First, the figures suggest that 
one man from every rifle platoon (consisting of an officer and 36 enlisted men) may 
have gone absent if anywhere near 3.6 per cent of front line troops absconded during 
the summer fighting. Such a reality would have had a considerable effect on primary 
group cohesion and discipline in Eighth Army. Second, the seriousness of the issue 
may be better understood when the pace at which the problem was developing is 
taken into account. Auchinleck reported, in the first of his two telegrams to the War 
Office, that there had been 310 convictions for desertion and cowardice in the 12 
months from April 1941 to February 1942, that is an average of about 26 convictions 
per month. The average monthly number of soldiers sentenced for desertion in the 
five months from February to June 1942, as reported in his second telegram, had 
grown to 34, a 31 per cent increase. Between 16 June and 13 July 1942, however, 907 
absentees were reported to the Corps of Military Police of whom 430 were 
subsequently apprehended. Mark Connelly and Walter Miller have pointed out that 
the majority of those accused of desertion or cowardice in battle were usually 
convicted at courts martial. They estimated that the ratio of convictions to acquittals 
was about six or seven to one. As Connelly and Miller put it, ‘the odds against 
acquittal were . . . high’ due to the ‘High Command’s desire to provide examples to 
stiffen discipline and morale’.22 This would suggest that of the 430 absentees who, at 
the time of writing, had been apprehended, at least around 370 would have been 
convicted. In other words, it is highly likely that there was a minimum of a tenfold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
normally the four rifle companies that made up each of the nine infantry battalions in a division 
(c.4,464 men or 25.5 per cent of the total). This reality constantly vexed Churchill who complained 
about the poor tail to teeth ratio in the British Army. 
22 Mark Connelly and Walter Miller, ‘British Courts Martial in North Africa, 1940-3’, Twentieth 
Century British History, vol. 15, no. 3, 2004, pp. 231-2. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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increase in monthly convictions for desertion from the February to June period to the 
June/July period. 
 
Auchinleck’s steps to address the crisis must be understood in this light; he was trying 
to stop and reverse a growth in the incidence of desertion that was so high that it 
posed a direct risk to operations. This growth may indeed have been to a large extent 
the result of his policies and management of the battle, but it would have been an 
unforgivable oversight not to address the significant problem that was unfolding in 
the desert. Whether or not the reintroduction of the death penalty was the appropriate 
measure to take, there was clearly a crisis to address. It was certainly the perception of 
commanders on the ground that ‘numerous cases of AWOL [Absence Without Leave] 
from the front line’ were taking place and that this was undermining operations.23   
 
Other statistics for courts martial convictions in British overseas commands in 1941 
and 1942 support this contention. They show that there was a peak during 
August/September 1942, the time when courts martial proceeding, against those who 
had gone absent or deserted during the summer fighting, would have been taking 
place. 
  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 South African Military Archives Depot (SAMAD) Divisional Documents Box 119 Union Defence 
Force Adm. HQ Middle East Forces to Comd. SA Base, ‘Illegal Absentees’, 8 August 1942. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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Figure One: Courts Martial Convictions for Absence and Desertion Overseas 
Commands, 1941-42.24 
 
 
These figures, it must be accepted, are not a perfect guide to what was happening in 
the desert. For instance, the peak in August and September 1942 could have been 
caused by men deserting in other theatres, such as in the Far East. Unfortunately, 
records relating solely to desertion in the Middle East have generally not survived.25 
Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that these figures correspond quite closely 
to the estimates presented above and the reality that no major actions were taking 
place in other theatres at this time, it does seem highly likely that this peak was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Chart derived from NA WO 277/7 Comparative Chart of ‘Absence’ and ‘Desertion’ Home Forces 
and Overseas Commands from 1 September 1939 to 31 August 1945. 
25 Connelly and Miller, ‘British Courts Martial in North Africa, 1940-3’, p. 235. 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1.	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caused by the crisis in the desert. Another set of figures support this contention. 
Numbers in detention barracks in the Middle East increased very sharply around this 
time, with those in No. 50 Detention Barracks in Egypt, for instance, increasing from 
sixty-six in April 1940 to 600 in September 1942,26 a nine-fold increase.27  
 
It should also be noted that the overall problem facing Auchinleck and Eighth Army 
was much greater than that posed solely by the sudden growth in the rate of 
desertions. In his July cable, Auchinleck presented another set of figures to the War 
Office to support his request for a reintroduction of the death penalty. These statistics 
showed an alarming ratio of ‘missing’ to overall casualties. Between the beginning of 
Rommel’s offensive at the end of May and late July, Eighth Army lost 1,700 killed 
and 6,000 wounded, but had 57,000 categorized as missing, ‘of whom the great 
majority must be assumed to be prisoners of war.’28 
 
These figures equate to an overall missing/surrender rate for Eighth Army of about 88 
per cent of casualties and tally with other reports sent to the War Office in August 
1942.29 Around 82 to 86 per cent of United Kingdom casualties were classified as 
missing/surrender during the Gazala, Tobruk and July battles. The Australian 
missing/surrender rate was about 34 per cent, that of the New Zealanders was 42 per 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid., p. 236. 
27 Part of this increase could, to some extent, be attributed to the rise in the number of troops in the 
Middle East, but there was only a four times increase in the size of the MEF in the roughly 
corresponding period, increasing from 211,000 in November 1940 to 864,000 in August 1942. 
28 NA WO 32/15773 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active 
Duty, 31 July 1942, p. 1. 
29 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA) Adam Papers, Box 2, Notes on A.C.S. Paper 
Comparison of Casualties, Libya, AG Stats, 6 August 1942; NA WO 163/51 The Army Council, Death 
Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active Service, 11 August 1942. 
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   10	  
cent while the South African and Indian rate was 90 per cent.30 The total number of 
POW and missing soldiers reported by the British Army during the Second World 
War amounted to 185,847; this was 32.6 per cent of total casualties. The statistics 
from the desert in the summer of 1942 were clearly out of line with the general 
picture and required an explanation.31  
 
Both General Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant General of the British Army, and Sir P. 
J. Grigg, the Secretary of State for War, agreed with this assessment. They accepted 
that these figures showed that the British soldier was ‘inclined to surrender rather than 
to fight it out,’ and therefore agreed to re-open the death penalty issue as demanded 
by Auchinleck.32 The Army Council similarly concluded that ‘the capitulation at 
Singapore, the fall of Tobruk and the large proportion of unwounded prisoners in the 
operations in Cyrenaica [the Western Desert], are pointers to a condition existing in 
the Army which does not appear to accord with its old traditions.’33 Auchinleck’s 
concerns, judging by this evidence, would appear therefore to have been well 
founded. 
 
. . . . . . . . . 
 
There are difficulties for the historian in attempting to apply the label of cowardice or 
courage to troops in action, whichever one of the two broad approaches to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 NA WO 32/10810 Battle Casualties (Exclusive of Deaths from Natural Causes) Incurred by Forces 
Under British Empire Control as Reported by “Hot Spot” cables from 3 September 1939 to 28 June 
1946. 
31 LHCMA Adam Papers, Box 2, White Paper, Strengths and Casualties of the Armed Forces and 
Auxiliary Services of the United Kingdom 1939 to 1945 (London, His Majesty’s Stationery Office), 
p.8.  
32 NA WO 163/89 Executive Committee of the Army Council, The Death Penalty for Offences 
Committed on Active Service, 21 July 1942. 
33 NA WO 32/15773 The Army Council, Death Penalty in Relation to Offences Committed on Active 
Duty, 31 July 1942, p. 3. 
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conceptualising courage and cowardice, already outlined, is used. The first approach 
clearly suggests that desertion and surrender, behaviours that demonstrate a lack of 
willingness to fight, can be labelled as cowardice. This is certainly what Auchinleck 
was alluding to in his cables to the War Office. But soldiers are liable to desert or 
surrender for a multitude of reasons, many of which are entirely understandable and 
should not be characterised in a pejorative fashion. It can be argued, for instance, that 
the high proportion of prisoners to killed and wounded in the North African battles of 
the summer of 1942 proved little about the courage of Eighth Army. High numbers of 
surrenders often occurred in cases where un-armoured troops, surrounded by enemy 
tanks and bereft of anti-tank weapons, had little chance of fighting on and defeating 
the enemy. Referring to such cases of surrender as instances of cowardice suggests 
that their behaviour was unjustifiably deficient when one can certainly argue that it 
was not the soldiers’ fault that they were placed in a poor tactical situation with 
inadequate weaponry.	  	  	  
Connelly and Miller have reached similar conclusions regarding surrender in the 
British Army in France in 1940. They argued that: 
 
Surrender was often not the final act of disillusioned, broken men, but the final 
gesture of disciplined, but pragmatic, soldiers. Soldiers, especially middle-ranking 
and junior officers, appear to have reached the conclusion that further resistance 
would merely increase casualties to little effect and so ordered their men to lay down 
their arms. 34 
 
Irrespective of arguments such as these, a case can be made that the behaviour of 
these troops was deficient and that it was not acceptable for British servicemen to act 
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in this manner, irrespective of how rational such behaviour may appear to have been. 
British doctrine stipulated that every soldier was required to fight even when the 
situation appeared hopeless or the soldier might realistically expect to die or suffer 
wounds as a result. In such circumstances, the military deemed it inexcusable to 
surrender or desert. The 1929 Field Service Regulations (FSR) explained that ‘there is 
only one degree of resistance for troops . . . that is to the last round and the last man, 
unless definite orders to the contrary are received by the commander of those 
troops.’35 The Manual for Military Law stipulated that surrender  
 
. . . can only be committed by the person in charge of the garrison, post, etc, and not 
by the subordinate under his command. The surrender of a place by an officer 
charged with its defence can only be justified by the utmost necessity, such as want 
of provisions or water, the absence of hope of further relief, and the certainty or 
extreme probability that no further efforts could prevent the place with its garrison, 
their arms and munitions, falling into the hands of the enemy. Unless the necessity is 
shown, the conclusion must be that the surrender or abandonment was shameful, and 
therefore an offence under this section.36 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that commanders in France or in the desert considered 
their troops exempt from the requirements as set out in the FSR and the Manual of 
Military Law. Under these conditions, it is arguable that many of those soldiers who 
surrendered in France and in North Africa were acting outside of a strict interpretation 
of military expectations. 
 
Commanders in the desert certainly saw the matter in this light. Lieutenant-General 
Sir Leslie Morshead, the commander of 9th Australian Division, wrote to his men after 
the summer fighting, outlining what was expected of them in future battles. 
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In the war there have been far too many unwounded prisoners taken. The modern 
term ‘in the bag’ is too excusable, it is not harsh enough, and it seems to mitigate 
having failed to make a proper stand and even to having just merely surrendered. 
We must make it unfashionable. I have closely questioned escaped prisoners and I 
know what actually happened in some instances, I am sure that those who did not 
put up a fight must often ruminate over it in their prison camps especially in the 
winter months. 
 
You must impress on your officers, NCOs and men that when they are cut off or 
surrounded and there appears no hope of survival they must organise themselves 
into a defensive locality and hold out. They must be a good staunch Australian and 
not emulate the Italians. By so doing they will add enormously to the enemy’s 
difficulties and will assist materially the development of our own operations. And 
they will live to have pride and satisfaction in themselves instead of spending the 
rest of the war and a long time afterwards in prison camps. Nothing is ever 
hopeless so long as troops have stout hearts, and have weapons and ammunition. In 
this too is the test of real leadership and manhood.37 
 
There are thus some compelling reasons to conclude that the crisis in the desert in 
1942 may have been, at least to some degree, a result of a lack of willingness to fight 
among the troops. If courage is primarily a willingness to fight, and the behaviour of 
troops did not exhibit that willingness, it appears justifiable to characterise the 
behaviour of Eighth Army during the summer battles as cowardly.  
 
Focusing on a definition that relates courage and cowardice to fear also raises issues 
for the historian. ‘Fear is a normal, inevitable, useful reaction to danger . . . produced 
in a man’s body by his awareness of signs of danger in the world around him.’38 Some 
people claim that they do not experience fear in battle, but such people are, in reality, 
rare,39 or even nonexistent. During the Second World War, the army accepted that all 
soldiers would experience fear. As Ronald Adam, the Adjutant General, explained in 
a letter to senior officers in December 1943, 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Australian War Memorial (AWM) 3 DRL 2632 Morshead Papers, El Alamein, 10 October 1942. 
38 John Dollard, Fear in Battle (New Haven, 1943), p. 70. 
39 Holmes, Acts of War, pp. 204-5.  
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Fear is a universal emotion. Like jealousy, hatred or love, it is experienced by 
every normal human being under conditions which are conducive to it . . . A brave 
man and a coward have this in common. They both feel fear – one controls it, the 
other collapses under it.40 
 
With reference to the levels of fear felt by soldiers under fire, the British General and 
theorist J. F. C. Fuller argued that ‘in an attack half the men on a firing line are in 
terror and the other half are unnerved.’41 Samuel A. Stouffer has outlined why the 
environment of battle is so stressful: 
 
The intense emotional strains of actual battle are to a large extent rooted in the 
inescapable fear and anxiety reactions continually aroused by ever-present stimuli 
which signify objective threats of danger. The threats of being maimed, of 
undergoing unbearable pain, and of being completely annihilated elicit intense fear 
reactions which may severely interfere with successful performance.42 
 
In his study of 300 American veterans from the Spanish Civil War, John Dollard 
showed that 74 per cent of men had experienced fear when going into their first 
combat action while as many as 91 per cent of men who had been in combat on more 
than one occasion had experienced fear. Fifty-nine per cent of the veterans questioned 
by Dollard said that there were ‘occasions when they were too cautious and had their 
efficiency reduced by fear.’43 In his study of over 12,000 American soldiers in both 
the Pacific and European theatres of operations in the Second World War, moreover, 
Stouffer demonstrated that a majority of men were willing to admit that they 
experienced fear and anxiety in combat.44 In a survey carried out in the European 
theatre of operations in August 1944, two hundred and seventy-seven wounded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 LHCMA Adam V/6, Adam to Corps District, District, Divisional and Area Commanders, December 
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42 Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, vol. II (Princeton, 
1949), p. 192. 
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combat veterans were asked about their experiences. The results were startling. Sixty-
five per cent of the men questioned admitted having had at least one experience in 
combat in which they were unable to perform adequately because of intense fear. 
Forty-two per cent said that they had not been able to perform in combat ‘once or 
twice’ or ‘a few times’ because of fear. Twenty-three per cent reported that they had 
not been able to perform because of fear ‘several times’ or ‘many times’ in combat.45 
As S.L.A. Marshall put it, fear was ‘ever present’ on the battlefield, and ‘uncontrolled 
fear’ was ultimately the ‘enemy of successful operations.’46  
 
Fear could indeed have been a major factor in the large increase in rates of desertion 
and surrender in Eighth Army during the summer of 1942. The bulk of the soldiers 
who made up the desert army after 1941 were conscripts, volunteers and territorials. 
These men, unaccustomed to the noise of battle, and unused to the threat of injury and 
death, were faced with a traumatic and profoundly unfamiliar environment. Sir 
Richard O’Connor, who commanded the Western Desert Force until his capture in 
1941 and later commanded VIII Corps in Normandy, agreed with this general 
assertion. He believed that ‘the great majority’ of desertions in the British Army were 
committed by men who were ‘frightened of shelling, & wanted an excuse to get out of 
it.’ But, he said, ‘if people were allowed to leave the battlefield every time they were 
frightened the army would have disintegrated in no time.’ For this reason, ‘horrible as 
it is,’ he was ‘in favour of the death penalty in certain cases,’ as he believed it acted as 
an effective deterrent to such behaviours.47 This is a crucial point. The army could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid., pp. 201-2. The sample taken was not a cross section of all troops, but rather a random selection 
of wounded combat veterans in army hospitals. 
46 S. L. A. Marshall, Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Gloucester, 
1978), p. 37. 
47 French, ‘Discipline and the Death Penalty’, p. 538. O’Connor after being captured by the Germans 
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limit the detrimental effect of having men who would not fight when out-gunned and 
placed in a poor tactical position. If battle was managed effectively, such scenarios 
would occur rarely. It could not, however, afford to have men who would not fight 
when faced with fear, due to the inescapable fact that fear was ever present on the 
battlefield. This again suggests that it may be justifiable to label the men of Eighth 
Army as cowards. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
 
Whether one takes the view that courage is primarily willingness to fight or primarily 
the ability to deal with fear, it would appear, at the very least, that there are serious 
questions regarding the lack of courage or even the cowardice of Eighth Army at this 
time. If troops are to be labelled cowards, however, one might ask, to what purpose? 
The psychological rationale of emotive words, such as courage and cowardice, ‘is to 
make people act effectively.’48 Field Marshal Lord Slim commented after the Second 
World War that ‘I don’t believe there’s any man who, in his heart of hearts, wouldn’t 
rather be called brave than have any other virtue attributed to him.’49 The opposite 
could be said for cowardice. Usage of such words plays an important part in 
inculcating and encouraging positive battlefield behaviours.50 But they have little 
place in critical analysis of the past. As Richard Holmes has argued, ‘we must be 
remorselessly objective in our approach’ to issues as complex as courage and 
cowardice.51  
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Courage is very much an attribute of an individual and is often described as one of the 
key moral virtues. Any judgment of an historian about the personal character of an 
individual, or a group of combatants, would be overwhelmingly subjective. Courage, 
however, emanates not only from individual qualities of character but also from 
external influences, such as factors relating to the military institution or combat 
environment.52 An historian can realistically assess these external influences that 
impact on individuals and build their willingness to fight or allow them to manage 
their fear.  
 
The external factors that affect a soldier’s willingness to fight are better understood 
today than ever before.53 However, historians have not grappled to the same degree 
with the specific question of how the soldier can overcome fear in battle. According 
to Dollard, a social anthropologist, the objective of good ‘fear policy’ was to manage 
it by giving the soldier those tools that he needed to overcome his fear.54 Dollard 
asked his veterans the following question in an attempt to identify how this can be 
done: ‘What would you say are the most important things that help a man overcome 
fear in battle?’  
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Figure Two: What would you say are the most important things that help a man 
overcome fear in battle?55 
 
 
Dollard’s respondents were all volunteers for a conflict infused with ideological 
motives and their responses reflected this reality, i.e. the response for ‘belief in war 
aims’ got an extremely high score. However, the relative importance accorded the 
various factors is less relevant to this study than the actual factors selected by the 
respondents. They can be broadly categorised as follows: 
 
• Belief in a cause (incorporating ‘belief in war aims’ and ‘hatred of enemy’) 
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• Leadership (incorporating ‘leadership’, ‘information on military situation’ and 
‘distractions’) 
• Training (incorporating ‘training’, ‘control of fear’) 
• Quality of weapons (‘materiel’) 
• Primary group (‘esprit de corps’) 
 
In fact, these are some of the factors that can also be identified as being the mainstays 
of an army’s willingness to fight and its morale. This raises some interesting 
questions regarding the relationship between courage, cowardice and morale, which 
can be defined as the willingness of an individual or group to prepare for and engage 
in an action required by an authority or institution.56   
 
. . . . . . . . . 
 
The nineteenth century French strategist, Charles Ardant Du Picq, argued that there 
were only a ‘few really brave’ or courageous men in an army. Gideon, he pointed out, 
‘was lucky to find three hundred in thirty thousand.’57 Effective battlefield 
performance, he postulated, was contingent instead on the military’s ability to 
inculcate morale in the army. High morale, he argued, motivated the soldier to fight 
and shielded the ordinary recruit from his fear and prevented it from overcoming him 
in battle. The soldier’s willingness to fight, engendered either by desire or by 
discipline,58 could thus trump his fear of annihilation, disfigurement or pain.59 Where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, pp. 9-10. 
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morale failed, in what Bruce Allen Watson referred to as the ‘crisis’ point,60 the 
soldier was left de-motivated and burdened with his terror and, therefore, inevitably 
ran away, deserted or surrendered. Dollard argued that ‘fear, fused with hunger and 
fatigue,’ tended to drive men out of battle. ‘Other stronger forces’, therefore, ‘must be 
pitted against fear to drive men in.’ Fear is thus ‘controlled by making other forces 
stronger than it. The whole organization of an efficient army helps to control fear.’61 
 
It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that soldiers are liable to succumb to de-
motivation and fear in battle if the external forces that help them strengthen 
motivation and overcome fear are deficient or lacking to a critical degree. This 
contention is broadly accepted in the secondary literature today.62 ‘Modern history’, 
as Du Picq points out, ‘furnishes us with no examples of stonewall troops who can 
neither be shaken nor driven back.’63 Even in the ancient world, where the courageous 
were honour bound to hold their positions in the line, major heroes were ‘constantly 
shrinking back into the mass behind them or fleeing wholesale along with their 
followers.’64  
 
Lord Moran built his own theory on courage on a similar observation. He argued that 
all soldiers have what he referred to as a limited stock of courage. ‘A man’s courage 
is his capital,’ he wrote, ‘and he is always spending. The call on the bank may be only 
the daily drain of the front line or it may be a sudden draft which threatens to close 
the account.’65 R. Swank and W. Marchand put a figure of 60 days on the soldier’s 
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stock of courage when describing combat in Normandy in 1944. According to 
Richard Holmes, this figure was very low and reflected the intensity of the combat in 
the Bocage of Normandy. Holmes argued that, in general, the British estimated that a 
rifleman could last for about 400 combat days while the Americans reckoned that 
soldiers would keep going for about 200 to 240 combat days.66 
 
Figure Three: Degree of Combat Efficiency in Relation to Days Spent in Combat.67 
 
The undoubtedly negative connotations attached to cowardice in battle and the 
positive ones attached to courage are therefore arguably unhelpful in understanding 
the human dimension in warfare. The nature of warfare guarantees that the factors 
that maintain morale in battle will gradually be worn away. Belief in a cause will be 
tested by setbacks. Good leaders will be killed or replaced by poor ones. Training and 	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materiel will sometimes be inadequate for the job at hand. The bonds of the primary 
group will be broken by casualties and the fog of war will twist and distort the 
information available to the man on the front line. It is extremely difficult in an 
environment governed by chance and managed by humans to continuously maintain 
at a high level those factors (morale) that encourage willingness to fight and support 
the soldier in the struggle against fear. Emotive terms should thus be avoided when 
attempting to describe inescapable and rationally explainable outcomes. 
 
In addition, an emphasis on courage and cowardice, both of which focus primarily on 
the individual, obfuscates the state and military’s responsibility to foster, generate and 
train for morale. It unbalances requirements away from the state and organisation to 
the individual.68 As John Baynes has argued ‘courage’ can only be ‘found in a unit in 
which morale is at its peak.’69 Therefore, as Du Picq pointed out, the primary role of 
the army must be to organize its men so as to best inculcate morale.70 All soldiers will 
eventually become cowards if we adhere to strict definitions of the term. At the same 
time all soldiers can be labeled courageous if they are properly motivated to fight and 
prepared by the state and military to deal with the unavoidable fear of combat. This is 
not in any way to absolve the individual soldier from his responsibility to act 
courageously but it realistically places this obligation in its appropriate institutional 
and martial context. Responsibility and blame for courageous and cowardly actions 
must, therefore, fall mainly on the state and military establishment.  It holds, as a 
result, that if an historian wants to study courage, he must first study and understand 
morale.  	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. . . . . . . . . 
 
The many factors that engendered and supported morale (and therefore courage) in 
Eighth Army were noticeably undermined during the critical fighting around Tobruk 
and on the Gazala and El Alamein lines in the summer of 1942. A brief appraisal of 
the five broad categories of factors that influence a soldier’s ability to overcome fear 
in battle derived from Dollard’s questionnaire (Figure Two) illustrates this point. 
 
In the early years of the war, the War Office attached no great importance to 
ideological motives and made little effort to inculcate the men in the desert with 
ideological fervour.71 The available evidence suggests that, partly as a result of this, 
many of the factors that influenced the soldier’s relationship with the cause he was 
fighting for were undermined during the critical battles of the summer of 1942. News 
from home and about the war generally was noticeably lacking, while formalised 
army education was only beginning to take root in Eighth Army and would not pay 
dividends until October/November 1942.  
 
Of perhaps greatest significance during this period was the maintenance of the 
soldiers' relationships with their loved ones. Citizen-soldiers left families, businesses, 
and farms at home. Nevertheless, they fought to preserve these bastions of peaceful 
existence from the enemy. As Hew Strachan has argued, ‘the soldier may excoriate 
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the politician and the war profiteer, but he still fights for home and hearth – for 
mother, wife, and children.’72 
 
The length of separation, combined with the irregularity and slowness of mail, put 
tremendous strain on many of the soldiers’ relationships. No news or bad news could 
cause misunderstandings or jealousies, which were a real and substantial danger to 
morale. These trends were exacerbated by the presence of large numbers of foreign 
Allied troops in the British, New Zealand, Australian and South African homelands. 
All this drove the soldiers of Eighth Army to such levels of jealousy and worry about 
the fidelity of their wives and girlfriends that the problem almost became an 
epidemic. The censorship summary for Eighth Army for 27 May to 2 June, right at the 
start of the Axis summer offensive, commented that ‘there appears to be no 
slackening of mail from home relating to domestic tragedies and this type of news 
seems to have an increasingly adverse effect on the morale of the troops. The hatred 
the troops show for overseas troops in Britain is very real and finds a great deal of 
expression throughout the mail.’73 In July 1942, one man wrote to his wife, ‘I tell you 
what our tent is called now, love, it is called the “Jilted Lovers Tent,” because there 
are four chaps in this tent who were engaged, but now their girls have broken it off 
and in three cases the girls have married Canadians.’ Another stated, ‘unfortunately 
the women of England are not playing the game, we have just had another chap 
whose wife has been put in the family way by another man – that makes 15 out of 160 
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of us [c. 9 per cent], good going eh?’74 The censor described these examples as ‘by no 
means being isolated case[s]’ and pointed out that ‘this subject, apart from the ebb 
and flow of the battle itself, has a greater effect on the men’s morale than any other 
single factor.75 By August 1942, newspapers were reporting that Free French, Czech 
and Polish troops in the UK were marrying on average 600 English girls a month. The 
censor stated that these reports were ‘doing more harm among our men than anything 
Dr. Goebbels can produce.’76  
 
The introduction of army education and more enlightened welfare policies later in the 
campaign eventually made a big difference in combating such problems. 
Nevertheless, the evidence from the desert suggests that many of the drivers that 
reinforced the soldier’s connection with the causes he was fighting for were 
fundamentally undermined during the summer of 1942. Furthermore, the legend that 
both sides took part in a ‘war without hate’ suggests that ideological motivations were 
of no great importance to combat morale in Eighth Army. The remarkable respect that 
Eighth Army held for its German enemy during much of the desert fighting was a 
matter the censorship reports consistently commented upon and led, according to the 
censors, to increased rates of surrender among the troops.77 The morale report for May 
to July 1942 clearly related the problem of increased rates of surrender to the fact that 
‘many of the troops still want to know what we are fighting for.’78 
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The contribution of Eighth Army’s leadership to morale was also undermined during 
the summer battles. This was especially notable when Eighth Army compared its own 
leadership to that of Rommel on the Axis side. The censorship summary for 1 to 7 
July stated that ‘the Eighth Army is without doubt a very angry army . . . Our reverse 
in Libya is attributed by a number of writers from Field Rank to Trooper to the fact 
that “Rommel seems to be a better General.”’ It was commonly believed that under 
the right leadership, ‘we would prove more than a match for the Axis forces.’79 The 
summary for 8 to 14 July concluded that ‘the outstanding criticism was undoubtedly 
that of leadership; the opinion that we have been out-generalled is unfortunately 
widely held.’80  
 
The men’s criticisms were clearly targeted at Auchinleck and Ritchie.81 It was 
Auchinleck’s attempts to reinstate the death penalty that perhaps said most about 
leadership in Eighth Army and its effect on morale in the summer of 1942. As Gary 
Sheffield has argued, ‘the ideal leader is one who relies mainly on personal and expert 
power. A poor leader is one who relies mainly on institutional and coercive power.’82 
Auchinleck had clearly failed to maintain morale by power of his leadership and 
command style. Instead, he was forced to turn to policies of coercion to maintain his 
troops’ willingness and discipline to fight. By 23 June his relationship with his troops 
had deteriorated to such an extent that he felt that he had no choice but to tender his 
resignation. He wrote to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan 
Brooke, in London, accepting full responsibility for all that had occurred in the desert. 
He offered to vacate the post of Commander-in-Chief admitting to a ‘loss of 	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influence’ with the troops ‘due to lack of success, absence of luck and all other things 
which affect the morale of an army.’83 
 
The quality of more junior officers within Eighth Army was also a problem during the 
summer of 1942. The censorship summary for 8 to 14 July pointed out that ‘many 
officers fail to inspire confidence in their men.’84 A 1st South African Division 
memorandum, written in August 1942, on the ‘Morale of South African Troops in the 
Middle East’, emphasised that the problem of inefficient officers was a ‘theme of 
endless discussion’ among the men. The memorandum stated that it was generally felt 
that officers ‘of proved incompetence should be demoted and replaced much more 
often than actually happens.’ It was equally believed that successful officers should be 
promoted. A frequent statement among the troops was that the ‘Russians would have 
shot an officer for this or that.’85 The Commander-in-Chief Home Forces probably 
captured the character of the problem most accurately when referring to the death 
penalty debate in August 1942. He reiterated that the solution to the surrender 
problem in the desert lay principally ‘in the training of a corps of officers, whose 
efficiency, example and instinctive interest in their work and the troops would compel 
the respect of the men.’86 The suggestion was that this was not the case in the desert in 
the summer of 1942.  
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Training also played a hugely important role in inculcating morale.87 For most of 1941 
and 1942 the troops who fought in the desert were handicapped by a training regime 
that was doctrinally and operationally unprepared for war.88 The British Army, as a 
whole, increased its numbers on an enormous scale following the declaration of war 
in September 1939.89 By June 1941, its fully trained cadre of regular soldiers made up 
at most just over 10 per cent of the forces available.90 The situation in North Africa 
was similar. From the beginning of the desert campaign to the vital battle of El 
Alamein 1942, the MEF more than quadrupled in size.91 The desert army was, with 
the exception of the Western Desert Force that fought against the Italians in 1940/1, a 
citizen army.  
 
It was close to impossible to turn these newly raised forces into a confident, highly 
trained army overnight.92 Niall Barr has pointed out that there was a general 
perception in North Africa that the level of training received by units was insufficient 
and inappropriate for desert conditions.93 Although many of these shortcomings were 
understandable, the costs to Eighth Army were substantial.94 The court of inquiry set 
up by Auchinleck, following the Tobruk disaster, ruled that ‘not only must troops be 
adequately armed but also they must be given sufficient opportunity to train in the 
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technical and tactical use of those arms before going into action.’95 Lieutenant-
General William ‘Straffer’ Gott pointed out on 12 July that ‘training demands time, 
and that time has seldom been forthcoming in the Middle East.’96 Gott strongly 
believed that, ‘unseasoned, inexperienced and poorly trained troops’ had ‘no place on 
any battlefield, but there were some who came under this category in the recent 
fighting [around Tobruk].’97 
 
The blame for allowing untrained units into combat in the desert in May, June and 
July 1942 does not rest entirely at the door of the commanders in North Africa. 
Churchill put an enormous amount of pressure on Auchinleck to begin operations 
before he felt he was entirely ready.98 Nevertheless, Auchinleck admitted, in a letter to 
Brooke on 25 July 1942, that perhaps he had ‘asked too much of [the troops].’99 By 
the end of July, Auchinleck was well aware that his army needed significant training. 
He wrote, in an appreciation of the situation in the Western Desert, on 27 July, that 
‘none of the formations in Eighth Army is now sufficiently trained for offensive 
operations. The Army badly needs either a reinforcement of well trained formations 
or a quiet period in which to train.’100Auchinleck believed that this lack of training, in 
addition to casualties and the frequent changes of commanding officers, had 
contributed to the ‘deterioration’ in the army’s ‘standard of discipline’ as reflected in 
the high rates of desertion and surrender suffered during the summer fighting.101  
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Eighth Army possessed a numerical advantage in weapons and manpower throughout 
the summer of 1942 that rarely converted into strategic or tactical success. Instead, the 
confidence, or lack of it, that soldiers had in their own weapons, as compared with 
those of their enemy, played a fundamentally important role in convincing them 
whether to risk their lives or not. The censorship summary for the week 17 to 23 June 
reported that the mail did show that the ‘morale of the troops had suffered a set back’ 
and that there were many references to the ‘superior armament of the enemy.’102 
Robin Dunn, a regular gunner officer whose battery formed part of the Second 
Armoured Brigade, recalled, ‘when I am asked why the great tank battle on June 12th 
was lost I say because . . . our tank crews were fighting an enemy better equipped 
than themselves, in tanks better armoured and more important with longer range 
guns.’ Dunn recounted how ‘this inequality was too much for even the finest units’ to 
bear. ‘The first time they met the Germans they would go in with tremendous dash 
and courage, and very few of them would come out. One by one the morale of these 
proud regiments was broken . . . It was more than flesh and blood and nerves could 
stand always to be asked to fight at such fearful odds.’103 Gott noted, in a report he 
wrote on the operation, that ‘in the first onslaught on May 26/27, armoured regiments 
had very heavy casualties, and it follows one cannot expect the same high standard of 
fighting in the second and subsequent battles.’104 
 
A study carried out in 1943 on the reasons why soldiers disliked particular weapons 
gives further insight into the relationship between morale and materiel in battle. The 
report pointed to a ‘notable demoralising effect’ when troops compared their own 	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weapons disadvantageously with those of the enemy. ‘The feeling of inequality – 
almost of injustice’, the report concluded, ‘appears to be very important.’105 The 
psychological supremacy enjoyed by the Axis, due to the powerful effect of their 
firepower, could in some way explain the surrender statistics that drove Auchinleck to 
demand a reintroduction of the death penalty. The desert environment meant that 
there was little scope for ambush and surprise, the natural ally of a poorly armed 
force.106 It was often possible to weigh up the odds of success or defeat miles away by 
identifying numbers and types of armoured vehicles and comparing them with one’s 
own. Throughout the desert war, surrenders made up a large proportion of British 
casualties, while it was comparatively rare for defenders to fight to the last man and 
the last round. Opposing forces would size each other up and decide on merit whether 
an engagement might produce a fruitful or futile outcome. In such circumstances, the 
attitude of each side to their own and the enemy’s weapons was crucial. More often 
than not, the Germans were able to win this psychological battle during the summer 
months of 1942, due to Eighth Army’s lack of confidence in its own equipment. Once 
a perfunctory effort to retaliate had been made, satisfying the defenders’ own 
conscience, if not the requirement of the FSR and Manual of Military Law, groups of 
men would surrender if they felt the fight could not be won.  
 
The inquiry following Tobruk found that inadequate weapons had played a major role 
in deflating the morale of the troops. It reported that, ‘to put infantry in battle against 
tanks without adequate means of defending themselves is not only useless but unfair 
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to the troops and exceedingly bad for their morale.’107 Not only did the defenders of 
Tobruk have few adequate means of defending themselves from armour, but they had 
endured the psychological blow of ‘witness[ing] the decisive defeat of our armour’, 
their only potential protectors in the open spaces of the Gazala line.108 Significantly, 
the report recommended that the capabilities of forces arrayed against each other in 
the desert should not be calculated by numbers of tanks and guns alone. Instead, it 
advised that ‘the fighting capacity of formations and units must be measured . . . also 
by their morale and the state of their equipment.’109 Thus, the morale crisis that began 
to rear its head in the summer of 1942 can to some extent be attributed to the 
perceived quality of Eighth Army’s weapons. Indeed Mark Johnston and Peter 
Stanley have blamed ‘a loss of faith in equipment’ as one of the key reasons for the 
crisis in the desert in 1942.110 
 
It is generally recognized today that the best bulwark to morale in battle is the primary 
group.111 Primary group theory stresses ‘that men fight not for a higher cause but for 
their “mates” and “buddies”.’112 The British Army unquestionably saw the primary 
group as the mainstay of morale in combat during the Second World War.113 
Nevertheless, there is much evidence to suggest that the primary group might not 
have functioned effectively during the critical months of fighting in the summer of 
1942. It would seem reasonable that the relevance of primary group theory, as it is 	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generally understood, should be limited by the extent to which there are factors 
militating against the primary group operating as a positive motivating force in a 
given conflict situation.  
 
One of these limitations is the effect of either high casualties or replacements on 
group cohesion and integrity.114 Heavy casualties sustained over a brief period made it 
especially difficult to sustain such relationships.115 An analysis of casualty figures 
from the summer battles in 1942 illustrates the extent of this problem. Around thirty-
six per cent of the total forces engaged became casualties,116 compared with fifteen 
per cent in Operation ‘Crusader’, in November/December 1941 and January 1942, 
and six per cent at El Alamein, in October and November 1942.117 The majority of 
these casualties were suffered by the infantry battalions that carried out much of the 
fighting during the summer battles. Figure Four gives an example of the percentage 
casualties suffered by some of the worst hit battalions.  
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Figure Four: Example of Infantry and Motor Battalion Casualties, Gazala 1942.118 
 
 
The armoured regiments suffered catastrophic casualties as well. The 4th and 7th Royal 
Tank Regiments were lost at Tobruk and needed to be reconstituted in the UK. 
Almost all the rest of the Royal Armoured Corps units involved in the summer battles 
needed reforming.119 Eighth Army began the Gazala battles with 849 tanks.120 Niall 
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Barr has estimated that, over the 17 days of fighting, Eighth Army suffered 1,188 
tanks damaged or destroyed.121 Figure Five demonstrates how these casualties were 
broken down. It shows that 1,093 tanks (140 per cent of the 849 tanks Eighth Army 
began the battle with) were knocked out either by tank and anti-tank guns or mines. 
Such tank losses would normally have resulted in some kind of disruption to the 
primary group due to the injury or death of one or more crew members. It was quite 
usual for a crew to suffer casualties or the loss of a tank, jump into a new tank with 
some replacement men, and then re-enter combat, only to be  ‘knocked out’ again.122 
In fact, the figures suggest that as many as 40 per cent of crews may have suffered 
casualties on more than one occasion, disrupting whatever bonds might have 
developed over a short time in combat.123 In addition, it must be noted, that these 
figures only include casualties from the 17 days of fighting on the Gazala line and do 
not account for further attrition suffered during the July battles on the El Alamein 
line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Ibid., p. 39. This would include replacements and those tanks that were quickly returned to battle 
after repair. 
122 Cyril Joly, Take These Men (London, 1955), p. 219. 
123 This figure would clearly be lower if replacement tanks with their own crews entered battle rather 
than depleted crews being given new tanks and replacements to allow them to continue fighting. 
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Figure Five: Tank Casualties, Gazala 1942.124 
 
 
It appears, therefore, that the large number of casualties in Eighth Army during the 
summer of 1942 would have reduced the integrity of the primary group and thus 
limited its ability to act as a positive force for morale. 
 
. . . . . . . . . 
 
It is apparent from the evidence adduced in this article that a number of the external 
influences that foster morale, and thus encourage the soldier to fight and bolster his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Chart derived from Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, pp. 251-2. 
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ability to cope with fear, were undermined during the battles at Gazala, Tobruk and 
on the El Alamein line in May, June and July 1942. The outcome of this crisis in 
morale was that many of the soldiers of Eighth Army deserted and surrendered in the 
face of the enemy. Using the commonly accepted conceptualisations of courage and 
cowardice outlined in this article, it is plausible, therefore, to refer to the behaviour of 
Eighth Army, during the fighting in the summer of 1942, as cowardly. This label, 
however, would grossly misrepresent the conduct of Eighth Army and falsely lay the 
blame for the setbacks that befell it on the shoulders of the troops.  
 
To suggest that the troops were cowards implies that the obvious deficiencies in 
Eighth Army were attributable in the main to the individual soldiers concerned. But 
the army that fought in the desert in the summer of 1942 was averagely led, 
inadequately trained, poorly equipped, uncertain of the cause it was fighting for and 
deprived of the effective support of sustainable primary groups. These deficiencies, 
along with many others, led to a crisis of morale that dramatically reduced the 
soldiers’ willingness to fight and their ability to combat the inevitable stresses and 
fears of the battlefield. Factors such as leadership and command, quality of weapons 
and manpower, training, the primary group, discipline, belief in a cause, and success 
in battle, all play a role in developing morale. These factors are all controllable by the 
state and the military. Therefore, the state and the military’s efforts to influence them 
deserve serious study and attention. The failure of troops should rarely, or perhaps 
never be attributed to cowardice. Rather the blame should fall where it deserves to 
fall, at the door of the political and military establishments whose job it is to inculcate 
that important factor in war: morale.	  
